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QUESTIONING THE COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN
THESIS: THE CASE OF TORTS
Richard L. Abel*

Liberal polities are built on the bedrock of separation of powers.
Legislatures make laws, executives implement them, and courts apply
them. Criticism of judicial activism and calls for judges to defer to
legislatures rest on this axiom. Yet those normative postulates depend
upon unexamined empirical claims. This article uses contemporary
tort cases to argue that these assumptions are certainly dubious and
probably false. I will begin by articulating the Counter-Majoritarian
Thesis ("CMT") as it is advanced in tort judgments.' Then I will survey two kinds of confrontations between court and legislature, which
appear to contradict the thesis. 2 In the first, innovative tort decisions
justified in terms of general societal interests are overturned by legislation serving special interests. 3 In the second, statutes serving special
interests force courts to choose between deferring to legislatures or
subjecting their actions to critical scrutiny. 4 I will conclude by inverting the CMT, arguing that courts tend to be populist and deliberative, whereas legislatures tend to be captured by special interests,
secretive, hasty, and unwilling or unable to offer reasons for their actions.5 This conclusion frees courts to reform the common law and
justifies narrow interpretation and strict scrutiny of legislation that
sacrifices general societal interests to special interests.
I.

THE COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN THESIS IN TORT DECISIONS

Although the CMT originates in federal constitutional law, 6 judges
often invoke it when declining to modify the common law or con* Connell Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. I am grateful for comments at a UCLA faculty colloquium (especially Dan Bussel, Ken Karst, Bill Klein, and Bill
Rubenstein) and at the conference on "Insurance, Risk & Responsibility" at the University of
Connecticut School of Law (especially Ross Cheit).
1. See infra Part I.
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part III.

6. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962); JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
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demning a majority for doing so. They typically advance the following
claims:
1. Legislatures make law; courts apply it.7 "This court must not assume the role of a super general assembly which can be called into
session to enact a rule of law whenever the proponents of that rule are
'8
unable to secure its passage in the proper forum."
2. Legislative inaction expresses an intent that the common law remain unchanged. 9 The majority "rejects over 100 years of tort law"
and "long established tort principles."' 10
a. This intent is clearer when the legislature modifies related
rules, explicitly declines to modify the rule in question, or is still
considering modification.11
b. Once legislation has been integrated into a common law domain, courts cannot change the components they created, because
12
this might affect the legislation.
3. Changes in the bench, far from providing an opportunity for judicial
innovation, detract from its legitimacy. 13
4. The popular will is better expressed by the legislature than the
14
judiciary.
a. Legislators hear all the affected interests, judges hear only the
interests of the parties before them.
b. Legislators are democratically responsible because they are
elected for short terms; judges are either appointed or elected to
long terms in non-partisan races that are devoid of issues and
rarely contested.
5. The legislature is better suited to innovate than the judiciary. 15
POLITICAL PROCESS

4-12 (1980);

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF

JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-104 (1980); STEPHEN C. HALPERN & CHARLES M. LAMB, SUPREME COURT
ACrIVISM AND RESTRAINT 386-92 (1982); STERLING HARWOOD, JUDICIAL ACrIVISM: A RESTRAINED DEFENSE 19-25 (1996); DONALD HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 1-12

(1977); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 374-80 (4th ed. 1991);
Michael J. Klarman, MajoritiarianJudicialReview: The Retrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491,
492-94 (1997); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 6-7 (1959).

7. Vater v. County of Glenn, 323 P.2d 85, 88 (Cal. 1958).
8. Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 903 (Il1. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
9. Li v. Yellow Cab, 532 P.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Cal. 1975) (Clark, J., dissenting).
10. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 939-40 (Cal. 1980) (Richardson, J., dissenting).
11. See id. at 943; Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 463-64 (Cal. 1961) (Schauer,
J., dissenting); Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 902-03; Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1232-33 (N.J. 1984)
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
12. See Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 902.
13. See Muskopf, 359 P.2d at 464.
14. See id.
15. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 569 (Cal. 1968) (Burke, J., dissenting).
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a. Superior investigative resources allow the legislature proactively to gather evidence; courts must passively rely on the parties
to create the record. 16 Courts should not act upon "seemingly
scant knowledge."'1 7 The "[1]egislature can collect information
"118

b. Legislatures can define problems themselves; courts must allow
parties to define the problems for them.
c. Legislatures deal with problems comprehensively; courts do so
in a piecemeal fashion. "Policy choices ... are, it seems to me,

best left to the judgment of a General Assembly staffed and
equipped to explore, consider, and resolve simultaneously these
many-faceted questions."' 19 "[I]t is for the Legislature to create
new causes of action and to fix the limits of recovery ....",20
"Only the Legislature, if it deems it wise to do so, can avoid such
difficulties by enacting a comprehensive plan for the compensation of automobile accident victims in place of or in addition to
'21
the law of negligence."
II.

POPULIST COURTS, CAPTURED LEGISLATURES

The assertion that legislatures are more democratic than courts willfully ignores everything we know about those institutions. 22 Money is
essential to gaining and retaining legislative office. A great deal of
16. See Li v. Yellow Cab, 532 P.2d 1226, 1247 (Cal. 1975).
17. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1232 (N.J. 1984).
18. Id. at 1233.
19. See Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 900 (Ill. 1981) (Underwood, J., dissenting).
20. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 823 (Cal. 1980) (Clark, J., dissenting).
21. Maloney v. Rath, 445 P.2d 513, 515 (Cal. 1968); Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal. App. 528,
532-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (quoting Maloney and citing Clark v. Dziabas, 445 P.2d 517, 518
(Cal. 1968)).
22. See WILLIAM B. GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE: THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 35-158 (1992); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13-

77 (1974); Gary S.Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J.ECON. 371, 372-73 (1983); Michael Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political
Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV.747, 768-819 (1991); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877-87 (1975);
Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 213-31 (1976); George Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MONT.SCI. 3, 10-13 (1971).
The locus classicus, of course, is MANCUR OLSON JR., THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 75117 (1982); MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 132-67 (rev. ed. 1971). See also George J. Stigler, Free Riders and Collective
Action, 5 BELL J. MONT.ScI. 359, 359 (1974).
Others draw similar conclusions from decision theory. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-7, 12 n.6 (2d ed. 1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 353-71 (1991); William H. Riker &

536

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:533

23
legislator behavior is governed by the fundraising imperative.
Tortfeasors make far larger campaign contributions than victims.
True, the plaintiffs' bar can represent victims, sometimes very effec-

tively: witness the failure of tort "reformers" over several decades to

pass federal legislation limiting product liability. 24 But the influence
of plaintiffs' lawyers can be neutralized by the defense bar, which is
organized and financed at least as well and probably better than the
plaintiff's bar.25 Furthermore, though the interests of victims and
their lawyers overlap, they are far from identical. Trial lawyers have
Barry R. Weingast, ConstitutionalRegulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences
of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REV. 373, 379-98 (1988).
For critiques, see generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REv. 873 (1987) (noting that reports of the "death of public interest" are
greatly exaggerated); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U.
CHI. L. REv. 63 (1990) (attempting to dispel misconceptions regarding the relationship between
legislative enactments and social well-being created by the economic approach); Mark Kelman,
On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and 'Empirical'Practiceof the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988) (discounting the "public choice" tradition for its
contempt of the legislative process); Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive
Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1991) (questioning the
explanatory power of public choice theory and its ability to aid in the judicial construction of
statutes).
23. Robert L. Jackson, Ethics Often Sidestepped in "Citizen Legislatures," L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1999, at A5.
24. That may be about to change. Neil A. Lewis, Optimism This Time for Bill to Lower Liability Awards, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1999, at 18; Neil A. Lewis, Chances Good for Caps on Damage Awards, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1997, at 20. The battle continues over limiting liability for
Y2K computer lawsuits. Jeri Clausing, Legislation Limiting Year 2000 Liability Is Introduced,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,1999, at C2; David E. Rosenbaum, Bill on Year 2000 Liability Is Set Aside in
the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at C20; Jube Shiver, House Backs Bill Limiting Y2K
Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1999, at A6.
25. In 1975, Chicago lawyers devoted an estimated 6% of their time to plaintiffs and 6% to
defendants in personal injury cases. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 24, Table 2.1 (rev. ed. 1994). Twenty years later
they devoted 6% to plaintiffs and 7% to defendants. John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers' Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995, 32 L. & Soc'Y REv. 751, 765 (1998).
In the 1998 California electoral campaigns, the insurance industry contributed $6.7 million,
while trial lawyers contributed $5.5 million. Dan Morain, Wealth Buys Access to State Politics,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1999, at Al. The latter figure included contributions from securities litigator Bill Lerach, the only personal injury lawyer among the 20 largest individual donors. These
figures omit the $30.4 million contributed by the tobacco industry, $11.1 million by development,
real estate and construction, $4.9 million by health care, and $2.4 million by agriculture. Id.
According to Public Campaign, the gun lobby spent $15.5 million on candidates, parties, and
issue advertising between 1991 and 1999. Advertisement, Public Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 1999, at A14.
On influence in Maryland tort "reform" in 1985-1986, see Paul Erik Parker, The Liability
Shortage of 1985-1986: A Study in Legislative Capacity, Ph.D. dissertation, political science, University of Maryland, 1989.
On the influence of group size and structure, see DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 135-45
(1989); ROBERT E. McCoRMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE
ECONOMY 103-12 (1981).
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successfully obstructed true no-fault automobile accident compensa-

tion schemes, which arguably would be better for car owners and acci26
dent victims than the outrageously wasteful fault-based scheme.
Organization is more essential to influencing legislatures than courts.
Tortfeasors are well organized, first by the corporate form, then by
industry associations. Victims are individuals who cannot be identified in advance and rarely engage in collective action after the fact.
Mothers Against Drunk Driving ("MADD") is the exception.
Tortfeasors also have better access to the expertise necessary to influence legislators. The following analysis of the outcomes of tort adjudi27
cation and legislation tends to falsify the CMT.

A.

Dramshop Act Cases

Most jurisdictions impose liability on commercial enterprises that
serve alcohol to obviously intoxicated persons who injure others. In
the name of the generally accepted tort goals of deterrence, lossspreading, and moral judgment, four state supreme courts (California,

28
New Jersey, Iowa, and Minnesota) extended liability to social hosts.

In each state, the legislature then eliminated, or substantially curtailed, that liability.2 9 In one, the court reasserted common law liabil-

ity, prompting the legislature to abrogate that liability as well. 30
Courts reluctantly acquiesced in these actions, while reiterating the
policy arguments for liability. 31 When a lower court declared that
"imposing civil liability discourages the illegal furnishing of liquor to
minors," 32 the state supreme court conceded that "no one would seriously disagree" but added ruefully: "We incorporated that policy in
both Ross and Trail, only to have their full impact nullified by legisla26. See Ross Cheit, State Adoption of Model Insurance Codes: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 23 PUBLIUS 49, 62 (Summer 1993); Edward L. Lascher, Jr., Loss Imposition and Institutional Characteristics: Learningfrom Automobile Insurance Reform in North America, 31 CANADIAN J. POL. SCL
143, 150 (1998); EDWARD L. LASCHER, JR., TE POLITICS OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE REFORM: IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN NORTH AMERICA 38-39 (1999).
27. Evidence about process is also relevant to my argument: actual influence on both litigation
(amicus briefs) and legislation (campaign contributions, role in drafting, participation in hearings, advertising, media coverage, lobbying, etc.). I am engaged in research on those topics.
28. Coulter v. Superior Court, 577 P.2d 669, 671 (Cal. 1978); Williams v. Klemesrud, 197
N.w.2d 614 (Iowa 1972); Trail v. Christian, 214 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 1973); Ross v. Ross, 200
N.W.2d 149 (Minn. 1972); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984).
29. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 25602(b), (c) (West 1997); Iowa Liquor and Beer Control
Act, First Session, 64th General Assembly, ch. 131, § 152; Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 390, § 1, 1977
Minn. Laws 887; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.5-.8 (West 1987).
30. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.49(1)(b) (West 1997) (abrograting Clark v. Mincks, 364
N.W.2d 226, 229 (Iowa 1985)).
31. Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836, 840 (Minn. 1982).
32. Holmquist v. Miller, 352 N.W.2d 47, 52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
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tive amendments. ' 33 The California Supreme Court sorrowfully
noted that "notwithstanding the clear documentation of the appalling
nature of the nationwide drunk driving problem, the Legislature with
the Governor's approval enacted legislation which was expressly
designed to 'abrogate' each of our three foregoing decisions. ' 34 The
exceptions to liability were "a patchwork of apparent inconsistencies
and anomalies," not "wise, sound, necessary, or in the public interest."'35 Dissenters continued to insist that liability would reduce drunk
driving accidents.
Judges differed in their attitudes toward legislatures. Some found
legislative preemption, even in inaction.36 Others perceived no such
intent, viewing inaction as a license for judicial creativity. 37 "If we
were to restrict this section of the Act to 'licensees'.

.

. we would nul-

lify the very purpose of the Act" to protect "the public welfare,
health, peace and morals of the people of the Commonwealth. '38 The
latter refused to read the repeal of the state Dramshop Act as precluding common law remedies, arguing that the legislature had to do this
explicitly. 39 Some attributed greater institutional competence to legislatures: "[A]ny extension of liability should be carefully considered
after all the factors have been examined and weighed in our legislative
' 40
process, that is, after extensive hearings, surveys and investigations.
But among the many legislatures curtailing liability, only New Jersey
actually held hearings. 41 Other judges declared that "[i]t requires no
legislative fact-finding to establish that risk-creating conduct existed
on the facts alleged. '42 Indeed, courts were better suited to modify
the law.
Adaptation of the law of torts to the myriad risk-creating agencies
and devices of modern society requires continuous application of
easily understood basic principles to a plethora of divergent and
continually emerging factual combinations. The task is singularly
suited to the judicial process and in the grand tradition of the com33. Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468, 471-72 (Minn. 1985).
34. Cory v. Shierloh, 629 P.2d 8, 10 (Cal. 1981).
35. Id. at 12-13.
36. See Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d, 226, 232-33 (Iowa 1985) (McGiverin, J., dissenting);
Runge v. Wattes, 589 P.2d 145, 147 (Mont. 1979).
37. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 577 P.2d 669, 673 (Cal. 1978).
38. Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507, 513-14 (Pa. 1983) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
39. See Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 458 P.2d 897, 901-03 (Wash. 1969) (Finley, J.,
dissenting).
40. Edgar v. Kajet, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
41. State of New Jersey, Commission on Alcoholic Beverage Liability, Final Report (Sept. 18,
1985).
42. Halvorson, 458 P.2d at 902 (Finley, J., dissenting).
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mon law.... The resolution of the problems involved would
be a
43

task requiring impracticable prodigies of legislative effort.
They also pointed to the collective action problem faced by victims
seeking to influence legislatures.
[I]t is almost a rule-of-thumb-worthy of judicial notice-that the
legislative branch usually reacts only to organized vocal public interest. There is no such organized vocal interest or effort on the part
of the socially significant number of miscellaneous persons injured
today through the drunkenness of a socially significant number of
motor vehicle operators. 44
B. Automobile Guest Statutes
As automobiles proliferated after World War I, the insurance industry persuaded legislatures to make recklessness a prerequisite for
driver liability to a gratuitous guest. A half century later, victims challenged those statutes. Some judges viewed even judicial protection of
owners as "settled law amenable only to the legislative power ....
[R]ejection now, by this court, would constitute judicial intrusion
upon the lawmaking function. ' 45 Others humbly acknowledged their
46
limited ability to "play the prophet" in devising the rule originally.
If time did not verify the prophecy then "the power which generated
''47 Judges who invalidated autothe rule must be exerted to correct it.
mobile guest statutes justified such activism by reference to both legislative action (adoption of comparative fault,48 policies favoring
liability, and compulsory insurance) and inaction (following restrictive
judicial interpretations of the guest statutes). Some felt compelled to
49
sustain the statute if it tended to advance any conceivable goal.
Such judges took judicial disagreements about legislative purpose as
grounds for concluding that the legislation could serve multiple purposes.50 Others ridiculed this approach. If the legislature made its
objectives clear, courts could not create fictitious alternatives, such as
protection of the uninsured guest driver, or an analogy between owners who themselves drove negligently and owners who tailed to control negligent drivers. "Although by straining our imagination we
could possibly derive a theoretically 'conceivable,' but totally unrealis43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Lippman v. Ostrum, 123 A.2d 230, 234 (N.J. 1956).
See Cohen v. Kaminetsky, 176 A.2d 483, 486 (N.J. 1961).
Id.
See McConvile v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 113 N.W.2d 14, 19-20 (Wis. 1962).
See Schwalbe v. Jones, 534 P.2d 73, 84 (Cal. 1975) (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
See Cooper v. Bray, 582 P.2d 604, 614 (Cal. 1978) (Richardson, J., dissenting).

540
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tic, state purpose that might support this classification scheme, we do
not believe our constitutional adjudicatory function should be gov'51
erned by such a highly fictional approach to statutory purpose.
Critical judges saw automobile guests as an inherently suspect category.5 2 Judicial modification of the law - creating loopholes through
strict construction,5 3 rendering anomalous the denial of claims by
owner passengers by striking down the basic law - introduced irra54
tionality, which courts then used to invalidate the entire statute.
Legislative re-enactment of portions not invalidated was an admission
55
of "political realities," which invited the court to invalidate the rest.
Requiring a relationship between the statute and the end by which it
was justified, these judges found that guest statutes neither encouraged hospitality nor discouraged fraud. 56 Both deferential and
critical judges supported their arguments with evidence outside the
record (suggesting that their votes reflected views about substance
57
rather than process).
C. Other Legislative Restrictions of Judicially Expanded
Tort Liability
In a variety of other areas, courts expanded liability to unorganized
victims, only to have organized defendants persuade legislatures to
curtail it. When California held that psychotherapists could be liable
for injuries inflicted by a patient,58 the therapeutic community convinced the legislature to limit liability to situations "where the patient
has communicated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of physical
violence against a reasonably identifiable victim." 59 When an intermediate California appellate court said in dictum that a parent might be
liable to a Tay-Sachs infant for wrongful life, 60 the legislature
promptly banned any action "against a parent of a child based upon
the claim that the child should not have been conceived or, if conceived, should not have been allowed to be born alive. ''61 When California eliminated the distinctions between the duties owed to
51. Brown v. Merlo, 506 P.2d 212, 219 n.7 (Cal. 1973).

52. Id. at 216 n.2.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 215.
Schwalbe v. Jones, 546 P.2d 1033, 1041 (Cal. 1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1046.
See id. at 1034-38, 1045.

57. See id. at 1036-37.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976).
CAL. Civ. CODE § 43.92 (West Supp. 1999).
See Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829 (Cal. 1988).
CAL. Civ. CODE § 43.6 (West Supp. 1999).
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trespassers, licensees, and invitees, 62 the legislature immunized landowners from negligence liability to victims convicted of one of twentyfive felonies. 63 When the Wisconsin Supreme Court followed California's lead, lumber companies persuaded the legislature to immunize
landowners from negligence liability to gratuitous users for recreational purposes.

64

When Wisconsin courts construed the statute nar-

rowly, the legislature excluded consideration of less than $150 and
included public lands that charged an entrance fee. 65 When Hawaii
allowed recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress mediated by damage to property, 66 the legislature added the requirement
of consequential physical injury or mental illness. 67 When New Jersey
subjected products to a "risk-utility" analysis and held asbestos manufacturers liable for risks they could not have known at the time of
manufacture, 68 the legislature significantly limited both rules. 69 Legislatures overturned decisions in four states extending product liability
to the sale of blood, 70 and the Maryland legislature precluded such
71
claims before they were made.
Liability for gunshot injuries vividly illustrates the relative influence
of victims and the National Rifle Association ("NRA") in judicial and
legislative fora. When the Maryland Supreme Court held a gun maker
liable for a shooting, 72 the legislature overturned the rule. 73 Although
the District of Columbia court declined to follow its neighbor, 74 District voters did so by referendum-a political process less easily corruptible by money than legislation. 75 When Atlanta (like four other
cities) sued gun manufacturers for the costs of treating gunshot victims, the lobbying arm of the NRA promptly persuaded the Georgia
62. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 565 (Cal. 1968).
63. CAL. CIV. CODE § 847 (West Supp. 1999).
64. See Dean P. Laing, Comment, Wisconsin's Recreational Use Statute: A CriticalAnalysis, 66
MARO. L. REV. 312, 322 (1983).

65. Id. at 341.
66. Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1071 (Haw. 1981); Rodrigues v.

State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970).
67. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-8.9 (Michie 1988).
68. O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
69. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:58C-1-7 (West 1987).
70. Miles Labs., Inc. v. Doe, 556 A.2d 1107, 1120 (Md. 1989).

71. 1987 Md. Laws 493; 1986 Md. Laws 259; 1982 Md. Laws 21.
72. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
73. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27 § 36-I (1996).

74. Delhanty v. Kinckley, 686 F. Supp. 920 (D.D.C. 1986).
75. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2382-84 (1999); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions:Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA

L. REv. 505 (1982).
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legislature to abort such lawsuits. The lobby bragged that "we are
going to devote a lot of time and resources" to similar efforts in other
jurisdictions. 76 "In the next year, I think we can probably get 25 or 30
more states to do the same thing." 77 The gun industry pulled its annual Shot Show (which draws some 30,000 people) out of New Orleans after that city filed suit. 78 A bill pending in Florida would make it
a felony for a local official to sue the gun industry. In June, 1999,
Texas Governor George W. Bush signed a bill outlawing gun lawsuits
by cities and counties. 79 A Georgia Republican (and NRA board
member) has introduced a bill into Congress to bar such suits. 80 Nevertheless, the massacre of thirteen at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, in April 1999, has prompted a host of gun-control
bills in state legislatures and Congress. 81
Laws limiting medical malpractice liability were passed at the behest of health care providers and their insurers. 82 The Illinois Civil
Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 were supported by local governments, school and park districts, the National Federation of Independent Businesses, the Illinois Farm Bureau, the not-for-profit sector, the
Illinois State Medical Society, and the "more than 30,000 Illinois businesses .

.

. and more than 20,000 professionals" of the Illinois Civil

Justice League.8 3 The bill, which began as "a technical change in a
provision relating to product liability actions," 84 and which merely
substituted "a" for "any," had grown to sixty-seven pages when it was
released to the House as "amended" two months later. It was approved by the House Executive Committee the next day without
change and passed the House a day later.85 After two days of hearings, the Senate Judiciary Committee adopted it without change, and
76. David Firestone, Gun Lobby Begins Concerted Attacks on Cities' Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 1999, at Al.
77. Id.
78. Id. A total of nine cities, Wayne County (Michigan), and two groups of cities led by Los
Angeles and San Francisco had sued as of May 1999. See Fox Butterfield, California Cities to Sue
Gun Makers Over Sales Methods, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1999, at A20.
79. Bush Signs Bill Banning Anti-Gun Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1999, at All.
80. Lizette Alvarez, A Republican Seeks to Ban Suits Against Gun Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 1999, at A16.
81. Mike Allen, Gun Owners Fear Connecticut Bill on Gun Seizures, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
1999, at A9; Frank Bruni, The New Politics of Gun Control,N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1999, § 4, at 4;
Sam Howe Verhovek, Gun Control Laws Gaining Support in Many States, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
1999, at Al.
82. See infra Part III.
83. See Kirk W. Dillard, Illinois' Landmark Tort Reform: The Sponsor's Policy Explanation,
27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 805, 807 n.11 (1996); infra Part III and accompanying text.
84. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1065 (I11.1997).
85. Id.
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the Senate passed it a few days later without any of the seventy
86
amendments offered by opponents.
Perhaps the most notorious example is the 1987 "back-of-the-napkin" deal in which the California legislature eliminated product liability for "inherently unsafe" "common consumer" products that are
"intended for personal consumption" and "known to be unsafe by the
ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community. '87 At a meeting in Frank Fats
Restaurant in Sacramento, Assembly Speaker Willie Brown brought
together the California Trial Lawyers Association, insurance industry,
California Medical Association, California Chamber of Commerce,
and manufacturers' lobbyists (including the Association for California
Tort Reform). The notes scrawled on the back of a napkin were
turned into a bill in less than forty-eight hours and brought to a vote
on the last night of the legislative session, after Brown refused the
request of consumer groups for further discussion. 88 Ten years later,
when California wanted to join the twenty-two states suing tobacco
companies, it amended the act to exclude tobacco from common consumer products. 89 Using Orwellian language, it declared that the act
had "never applied to, an action brought by a public entity" and did
not apply even if "the injured individual's claim against the defendant
may be barred by a prior version of this section." 90 The state's share
of the settlement was about $25 billion. 91
D. Immunities
Immunities usually protect discrete, organizable categories of
tortfeasors at the expense of dispersed, prospectively unidentifiable,
hard-to-organize victims. However, courts have curtailed or eliminated most of the immunities they originally created: charitable, intrafamilial, and sovereign. 92 Soon after California abolished common
law sovereign immunity, however, the legislature enacted a complex
86. Illinois Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, Ill. Pub. Law No. 89-7 (1995); Best, 689
N.E.2d at 1065, 1067-79.
87. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.45 (West 1998); JAMES RICHARDSON, WILLIE BROWN: A BiOGRAPHY 348-49 (1996).
88. RICHARDSON, supra note 87, at 347-49.
89. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 (West 1998).

90. Id.
91. Barry Meier, Tobacco Windfall Begins Tug-of-War Among Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
10, 1999, at Al.
92. In California, see, for example, Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1962) (family); Muskopf
v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961) (sovereign); Malloy v. Fong, 232 P.2d 241 (Cal.
1951) (charitable); Silva v. Providence Hosp. of Oakland, 97 P.2d 798 (Cal. 1939) (charitable).
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web of specific immunities. 93 The year after the New Jersey Supreme
95
Court abrogated charitable immunity, 94 the legislature reinstated it.
When a twelve-year-old boy committed suicide after being sexually
abused by his parochial school teacher and scoutmaster, the court felt
compelled to respect the immunity. 96 The three dissenting justices invoked "the strong policy reasons that withold immunity to a charitable
entity from liability for wrongful conduct not related to the charity's
legitimate purpose or with respect to a victim who does not otherwise
benefit from the works of the charity ....,,97
In all the examples above, courts protected plaintiffs and legislatures protected defendants. But this article is not a brief for constantly expanding tort liability. Rather, my argument is that, in
confrontations with organized interests, disorganized interests are
more disadvantaged in legislatures than in courts because of immutable institutional characteristics. Sometimes courts contract liability to
protect unorganized tortfeasors and legislatures expand it at the behest of organized victims. After the New York Court of Appeals created the "firefighter rule," denying those injured in fighting fires
recovery against property owners whose negligence caused the conflagration, 98 the legislature abrogated it (presumably at the instance of
the powerful firefighters' union). 99 When the court reaffirmed the
rule with respect to police officers, 1' ° the legislature again allowed actions based on statutory violations. 1 1 When the court construed the
statute as prospective, 10 2 the legislature made it retroactive. 10 3 When
the court rejected a claim based on violation of a statute codifying
common law duties, 1' the legislature allowed such an action. 10 5 When
courts denied claims unless police service was distinct from the statu93. See Arvo Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory
Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REV. 163, 163 (1963); James A. Cobey, The New California Governmental
Liability Statutes, 1 HARV. J. LEGIS. 16, 18 (1964).

94. See Benton v. YMCA, 141 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1958); Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary,
141 A.2d 276 (N.J. 1958); Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 141 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1958).
95. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 1987).
96. See Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, 472 A.2d 531, 532, 536 (N.J. 1984).
97. Id. at 543 (Handler, J., dissenting).
98. See Kenavan v. City of New York, 517 N.E.2d 872, 874 (N.Y. 1987).
99. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 205-a (McKinney 1989).

100. See Santangelo v. State, 521 N.E.2d 770, 771 (N.Y. 1988).
101. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 205-e (McKinney 1989).

102. See Guadagno v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 548 N.Y.S.2d 966, 967 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989).
103. 1994 N.Y. Laws c. 644, 1; 1992 N.Y. Laws c. 474, 2; 1990 N.Y. Laws c. 762, 1.
104. See Ramos v. Doesn't Matter Realty Corp., 579 N.Y.S.2d 541, 543 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
105. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 205-e(3) (McKinney 1989).
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tory violation, 10 6 the legislature abrogated that requirement, observing angrily that
our courts have continued to differ on the scope of the remedy afforded .... This act is intended to ensure once and for all that
section 205-e of the general municipal law is applied by the courts in
accordance with its original legislative intent to offer an umbrella of
protection for police officers .... 107

Although this had some effect, courts continued to protect landowners
against suits by employees of the New York City Transit Authority' 08
(because it was a public benefit corporation rather than a government
division) and to construe narrowly the requirement of a statutory
violation. 0 9
E. Agreements Not to Sue

The CMT maintains that legislatures are inherently superior rulemaking institutions, to which courts always must defer. By contrast, I
see both institutions as flawed, democratically and technically, but in
different ways. The New York experience with agreements not to sue
illustrates this mixed picture. Courts declined to enforce agreements
reflecting gross imbalances in bargaining power: with public transportation and utilities (both monopolies) and in employment. 10 Many of
the agreements they did enforce were the outcomes of relatively equal
bargaining power: commercial landlords and tenants,"' landowners
and builders, 1 2 or maintenance firms. 113 But courts also seemed ideologically committed to freedom of contract, disregarding the actual
bargaining power of patrons of parking garages, gyms, and other recreational facilities. 1 4 Legislatures, for their part, seemed quite solici106. See St. Jacques v. City of New York, 633 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Zanghi
v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Comm'n, 611 N.Y.S.2d 407, 408 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Sciarrotta v.
Valenzuela, 581 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Sledge v. City of New York, 570
N.Y.S.2d 134, 135 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
107. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 205-e(3) (McKinney 1989).
108. See Stella v. New York City Transit Auth., 657 N.Y.S.2d 702, 703 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
109. See, e.g., Desmond v. City of New York, 669 N.E.2d 472 (N.Y. 1996) (holding that internal police department guideline that established a general policy against high speed vehicular
pursuit where safety risks outweigh law enforcement was not a "requirement" under the relevant
statute).
110. See Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, 194 N.E. 692 (N.Y. 1935); Johnston v. Fargo,
77 N.E. 388 (N.Y. 1906); Emery v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 282 N.Y.S. 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935).
111. See Sutton Hill Assocs. v. Landes, 775 F. Supp. 682, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
112. See Board of Ed., Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, Town of Brookhaven v. Valden Assoc.,
Inc., 400 N.Y.S.2d 152 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
113. See Florence v. Merchants Cent. Alarm Co., 412 N.E.2d 1317, 1318 (N.Y. 1980).
114. See Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 177 N.E.2d 925 (N.Y. 1961) (gym); Baschuk v.
Diver's Way Scuba, Inc., 618 N.Y.S.2d 428 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (recreational facility); cf. Geise
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tous of parties with weak bargaining power: tenants,115 car owners, 1 6

party givers,"17 home owners, 1 8 and exercisers. 1 9 Sometimes, however, their abrogation of exculpatory clauses may have been influenced by defendants, such as landowners, who are better organized

than victims.' 20 This complex interaction suggests that neither institution can demand deference from the other.
III.

WHOLESALE LEGISLATIVE ABRIDGEMENT OF TORT CLAIMS:

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY, AND BEYOND

Each of the previous sections addressed a narrow area of tort law in
which courts typically championed unorganized interests in the name
of basic tort principles (deterrence, loss-spreading, moral judgment),
while legislatures typically responded to organized special interests

without offering principled justification. In the last two decades the
battleground has widened. The stakes are higher: first medical malpractice, then product liability, and now the entire universe of tort
law. Powerful, well-financed organizations of tortfeasors and insurers
have waged an ongoing campaign to convince the public that there is a

"tort litigation crisis," whose cause is tort law and jury verdicts, not
negligence and injuries, and to persuade legislators to restrict liability.12 ' Judges are split between adopting a deferential stance and subjecting such legislation to critical scrutiny.
A. Deference
Writing both for majorities upholding statutes and as dissenters
from judgments invalidating them, many judges deferred to legislation
curtailing tort remedies. They accepted legislative findings of a tort
v. Niagara County, 458 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (refusing to uphold an expulatory
clause signed by the plaintiff in suit against parking garage).
115. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 234 (McKinney 1989).
116. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIO. LAW § 5-325 (McKinney 1989).
117. See id. § 5-322.
118. See id. § 5-322.1.
119. See id. § 5-326.
120. See N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 235 (McKinney 1989).
121. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Jury Verdicts and the "Crisis" in Civil Justice, 11
JUST. SyS. J. 321, 322 (1986); Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics
of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs 269,
273 (Autumn 1989); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV.
1093, 1094 (1996); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 5
(1986); Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends about the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 717 (1998); Robert Hayden, The Cultural Logical of a PoliticalCrisis:
Common Sense, Hegemony and the Great American Liability Famine of 1986, 11 STUD. L., POL.
& Soc'y 95, 112 (1991); Fred Strasser, Tort Tales: Old Stories Never Die, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16,
1987, at 39.
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liability or insurance crisis. "[I]t is not the judiciary's function ...to

122
reweigh the 'legislative facts' underlying a legislative enactment.
As evidence of the emergency, some simply repeated claims by the
medical and insurance industries that insurance companies were withdrawing or setting prohibitive rates and that health care providers, unable to obtain insurance at reasonable cost, were going bare or
limiting or terminating practice. 123 Judges invoked commentators and
pointed to the concurrence of other states. 124 Some judges declined to
decide whether the crisis actually existed, insisting that doubtful findings of fact had to be accepted, and criticized their judicial brethren
for citing empirical data questioning the crisis.' 25 "Whatever flaws exist in the legislative findings, the proper forum to correct them is the
26
Texas legislature and not this court.'
Judges declared that promoting public health by making medical
care available at reasonable prices was obviously a legitimate state
purpose. 27 Judges held that the legislation was in the "public interest" and not intended to relieve the burden on health care providers.' 28 Some judges saw no need to determine the legislative purpose.
Judges also deferred to the legislature's explanation for the causes
of the problem it had defined. The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act
"reflects a specific legislative judgment that a causal relationship existed at the time between the settlement and prosecution of malpractice claims against health care providers and the actual and threatened
diminuation [sic] of health care services."'1 29 Judges declined to question whether the costs of medical negligence should be paid by malpractice or workers compensation insurance. "Policy judgments of
this nature are clearly within the legislative prerogative.' 130 Judges
found it "obvious" that increases in the number and size of malpractice claims raised the cost of medical services and encouraged defen122. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 683 P.2d
670, 678 (Cal. 1984).
123. See Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1086-87 (Fla. 1987); Taylor v. Karrer,
244 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Neb. 1976); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 775-76 (Ohio 1991) (Holmes,
J., dissenting); Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717, 736-40 (Ohio 1986) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
124. Mominee, 503 N.E.2d at 736-40.
125. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 178-93 (Ala. 1991) (Maddox, J.,
dissenting).
126. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 701 (Tex. 1988) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
127. Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Neb. 1977); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 424
N.E.2d 586, 594 (Ohio 1981).
128. Prendergast,256 N.W.2d at 669; Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 701.
129. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 590 (Ind. 1980).
130. Barme v. Wood, 689 P.2d 446, 451 (Cal. 1984).
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sive medicine. 131 They acquiesced in the legislative choice of
remedy. 132 "In addressing complicated social and economic problems,
the Legislature must be free to attempt a remedy even when the results are uncertain. 1 33 Judges accepted legislative assertions that abrogation of the collateral source rule and damage caps would reduce
the cost of premiums, and thus of medical care. "The reduction in
verdicts would presumably result in a reduction in premiums for malpractice insurance, making it affordable and available, helping to assure the public of continued health care services."'1 34 Mandatory
arbitration was a rational response. 135 Limiting contingent fees would
reduce frivolous suits and unrealistic settlement demands. 136 The legislature "could have reasonably believed that without some measure
of cost reduction, future medical malpractice claimants would experience difficulty in obtaining collectible judgments ....,,137 To do so
would revive the discredited substantive due process of the 1930s
United States Supreme Court. 138 Given profound disagreements
about the best response, judges declined to question particular
choices. "Any ten professionals.., would have ten different proposals to attempt to resolve the problems existing.' 39 The Florida Medical Malpractice Reform Act "bears a reasonable relationship to the
legitimate state interest of protecting the public health by ensuring the
availability of adequate medical care for the citizens of this state."'1 40
Indeed, "the Legislature is free to experiment and to innovate and to
do so at will, or even 'at whim.""41
Judges reiterated the two conventional arguments for deference.
First, the court contended that invalidating the Alabama Medical Liability Act
would empower this Court to supplant its own concept of what is
good or bad for what the legislature has decreed, and, by judicial
interpretation, to violate that great principle that is the bedrock of
131. Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 680 (Cal. 1985).
132. Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 752 (Ariz. 1977).
133. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 720 (Tex. 1988).
134. Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 293 N.W.2d 550, 558 (Iowa 1980).
135. Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 424 N.E.2d 586, 595 (Ohio 1981).
136. Roa v. Lodi Med. Group, Inc., 695 P.2d 164, 170-71 (Cal. 1985).
137. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 701.
138. Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717, 737 (Ohio 1986). For an argument that the
cases from Lochner to Parrishwere invalidating "special legislation," see G. EDWARD WHITE,
THE MYTHS OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: REVISITING LOCHNER v. NEW YORK (University of
Virginia School of Law Working Paper Series 98-25, Winter 1998).
139. Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 267 (Kan. 1988) (McFarland,
J., dissenting).
140. Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp., 403 So. 2d 365, 368 (Fla. 1981).
141. Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657, 668 (Neb. 1977).
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our government, that there are three co-equal branches of governenment, and that the legislature makes the laws, the 1executive
42
forces the laws, and the judiciary interprets the laws.
"For us to 'unfind' that there is a crisis on the state of this record is to
act like a 'super legislature' in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine."'1 43 "No member of this court or of any other court in this
nation can question the right of the elected representatives of the people ... to create or abolish within certain limitations a cause of action

under the common law."' 144 Legislation expressed the "people's right
of self-government." Were courts
to strike down those classifications which a majority of judges felt
unwise or unsound, the constitutionally mandated division of powers between such branches of our government would be substantially altered.... The least democratic branch of government would
a resulting diminution in the peobecome the most powerful, with
145

ple's right of self-government.
Second, whereas courts were limited to the "isolated vantage of the
litigation process," legislatures deliberated, creating study commis146
sions and debating and amending bills.
B.

CriticalScrutiny

If some judges were content to mouth clichds about deference to
the legislature, others engaged in critical scrutiny. Improved access to
health care was uncertain. "[O]ne can only speculate, in an act of
faith, that somehow the legislative scheme will benefit the tort victim.
We cannot embrace such nebulous reasoning when a constitutional
right is involved."'1 47 "In the context of persons catastrophically injured by medical negligence, we believe it is unreasonable and arbitrary to limit their recovery in a speculative experiment to determine
whether liability insurance rates will decrease.' 48 It was "logically
perverse" to pursue this goal by inflicting a "palpable burden" on victims, especially minors and the most seriously injured. 149 There was
"no logically supportable reason why the most severely injured mal142. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 183 (Ala. 1991) (Maddox, J.,
dissenting).

143. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 701 (Tex. 1998) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
144. Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717, 738 (Ohio 1986) (Wright, J., dissenting).
145. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 705 (Phillips, C. J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 707; Moore, 592 So. 2d at 182; Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757
P.2d 251, 266-67 (Kan. 1988).

147. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1089 (Fla. 1987).
148. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 691.
149. Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 701 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting);
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D. 1978).
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practice victims should be singled out to pay for special relief to medical tortfeasors and their insurers." 150 "This imprudent legislation
provides benefits to the wrongdoer at the expense of his victim."' 151
The statutes were special legislation: insufficiently evenhanded, underinclusive, and making arbitrary distinctions among victims.' 52 The Illinois damages cap "contains three arbitrary classifications that have no
reasonable connection to the stated legislative goals.' 53 The "prohibition against special legislation does not permit the entire burden of
the anticipated cost savings to rest on one class of injured plaintiffs."'1 54 A notice requirement was "special treatment afforded medical care providers."'1 55 Abrogation of the collateral source rule
"arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminates in favor of health care
providers."'1 56 Caps must apply to "all plaintiffs and all defendants...
evenhandedly. The familiar figure holding the scales of justice wears a
blindfold. She should not be required to peer around it to ascertain
whether the defendant is a 'health care provider' before deciding what
judgment to pronounce."'1 57
[T]he state has neither a compelling nor a legitimate interest in providing economic relief to one segment of society by depriving those
who have been wronged of access to, and remedy by, the judicial
system. If such a hypothesis were once approved, any profession,
business, or industry experiencing difficulty could be made the beneficiary of special legislation designed to ameliorate its economic
adversity by limiting access to the courts by those whom they have
damaged. Under such a system, our constitutional guarantees

would be gradually eroded, until this state became
no more than a
playground for the privileged and influential. 158
Although there was no justification for limiting these modifications to
medical malpractice, the statutes offered special treatment to health
care providers, thereby benefitting wrongdoers. This "panic motivated legislation" was passed at the behest of special interests, just
like the automobile guest statutes a half-century earlier, which were
150. Fein, 695 P.2d at 701 (Bird, C.J., dissenting); see also Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 771 (quoting
Nervo v. Pritchard, Stark App. No. CA-6560, June 10, 1985).
151. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 683 P.2d
670, 689 (Cal. 1984) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
152. Fein, 695 P.2d at 703-05 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
153. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1075 (Ill. 1997).
154. Id. at 1077.
155. Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 135-36.
156. Id.
157. Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525, 539 (Va. 1989) (Russell, J., dissenting).
158. Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 976 (Ariz. 1984).
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now being invalidated. 159 "The special protection granted to the narrowly defined class of 'health care providers' stands alone: a unique
monument to the effectiveness of a particularly vocal group, which
sought and found a privileged position in the courts.' 160 Judges even
expressed "considerable doubt if the purpose of the limitations as declared in the Act," "to assure that a liability insurance market be
available ...

at a reasonable cost," was "in fact the true object of

legislative concern.' 161 "It is irrational to grant special immunities for
the purpose of providing cheaper negligence insurance for health care
providers, when, unlike several other states, Iowa does not even require them to carry malpractice insurance.' 62 Far from deferring to
legislatures, these judges subjected such facially discriminatory statutes to strict scrutiny, demanding a "fair and substantial relation" to a
"compelling state interest."'1 63 "Under the strict scrutiny test"
adopted by Arizona, a compelling state interest "must be found from
legislative or adjudicative facts and not from hypothesis, speculation
or 'deference' to some unspecified legislative conception." 164 These
1 65
judges refused to accept the legislative finding of a "crisis."'
If saying so could make it so, unquestioning acceptance of the legislative findings that a medical malpractice crisis did and does exist in
Florida would be understandable, if not warranted. But this Court,
in making its determination of constitutionality, is not bound by
whatever preamble the legislature decides to attach to justify a statute ....
[W]e are remiss in simply accepting legislative findings without
question, because if no crisis exists, no statute could rationally relate
to its alleviation as
justification for special treatment of the medical
166
malpractice case.

A federal report found it "highly doubtful that any established carrier
has not entered the malpractice field because of weakness in the reinsurance market.' 67 The Iowa legislature "itself was in no way persuaded by the factual data gathered and the conclusions reached by
159. Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 293 N.W.2d 550, 561 (Iowa 1980) (Reynoldson,
C.J., dissenting).
160. Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 538 (Va. 1989) (Russell, J., dissenting).
161. Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 555 P.2d 399, 409-10 (Idaho 1976).
162. Rudolph, 293 N.W.2d at 564.
163. Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 975 (Ariz. 1984).

164. Id. at 979.
165. Jones, 555 P.2d at 412; Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657, 675 (Neb. 1977) (White,
J., dissenting).

166. Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Corp., 403 So. 2d 365, 369-70 (Fla. 1981) (Sundberg, C.J.,
dissenting).
167. Jones, 555 P.2d at 413 (citing U:S. DHEW, Report to the Secretary's Commission on
Medical Malpractice (1973)).
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the two committees.' 1 68 Other legislatures relied on data that did not
support their conclusions.169 Some did not even try to substantiate the
assertion that claims were driving up premiums, forcing insurers to
leave the market. "[T]he Legislature had before it no evidence that
the immense sacrifices of victims would result in appreciable savings
to the insurance companies" nor any "access to data specifically relating to noneconomic damages" (which it had capped). 170 Some legislatures relied on national statistics, which were inapplicable to that
state. 171 Judges invoked evidence both in the record and outside, as
well as the authority of commentators, for the propositions that: there
were few tort claims and even fewer large ones; 172 premiums were low
and not rising rapidly (perhaps even falling); 173 they were a small,
even insignificant, proportion of medical costs; 17 4 insurers were not
withdrawing; and health care providers had ample access to insurance
coverage and were not engaging in defensive medicine or curtailing or
terminating practice. 75 "One commentator in this state has claimed
that the 'crisis' was a creation of the insurance interests ....",176 A
crisis could not be chronic and might have diminished or ended since
passage of the legislation. 177 In any case, even a crisis could not justify
unconstitutional legislation. "We will become a court of men instead
of a court of law, guided by an alleged crisis instead of the wording of
the Constitution. The legislature interpreted our prior decisions as
saying 'Do whatever you want to do, as long as your decision is buttressed by a crisis.'"178

Judges also doubted the legislative explanation for any difficulties in
insuring health care providers. There were multiple causes: the actual
incidence of medical negligence; 179 changes in substantive law (the
real "tort reform"), leading to increases in the number and size of
168. Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr, 293 N.W.2d 550, 564 (Iowa 1980).
169. Jones, 555 P.2d at 412; Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 770 (Iowa 1991).
170. Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 700 (Cal. 1985).
171. Jones, 555 P.2d at 416; Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978).
172. Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 770-71.
173. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 683 P.2d
670, 693-94 (Mosk, J.,dissenting).
174. Moore v. Mobil Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 181 (Ala. 1991); Kansas Malpractice
Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 267-68 (Kan. 1988) (McFarland, J., dissenting).
175. Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717, 725-26 (Ohio 1986).
176. Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Corp., 403 So. 2d 365, 371 n.4 (Fla. 1981).
177. Id. at 371.
178. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1099 (Fla. 1987) (Adkins, J., concurring in

part, dissenting in part).
179. Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 555 P.2d 399, 414 (Idaho 1976).
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judgments; 80° juror evaluations of injuries; actuarial problems in predicting small numbers of events;' 8 ' interest rate fluctuations; bad investments; 8 2 and profiteering by insurance companies. 8 3 Some
commentators attributed the "alleged 'liability crisis"' to "a conspiracy by insurers to increase rates to cover faulty investment and underwriting decisions."' 4
If the diagnosis was wrong, so was the prescription. Although
judges denied questioning the wisdom of the legislation, 185 they did
require legislatures to demonstrate that statutes actually would solve
the problem. "To permit the legislature to act as the sole arbiter of
such juxtaposition [of the $400,000 damages cap to the goal of reduc18 6
ing the cost of health care] would be to vacate our judicial role.'
The Texas Medical Professional Study Commission, relied on by the
legislature, "could not conclude there was any correlation between a
damage cap and the stated legislative purpose of improved health
care.... One independent study has concluded that there is no relationship between a damage cap and increases in insurance rates
,187 Legislatures had to offer data showing the size of
...
noneconomic damages and the insurance savings if these were capped.
"[T]he lack of wisdom of a statute which shifts the risk of practicing
medicine from a health-care provider to the health-care recipient who
is required to subsidize the provider's costs in spite of the fact that he
is the party least able to bear such costs is self-evident.'1 8 8 The Illinois Supreme Court was "unable to discern any connection between
the automatic reduction of one type of compensatory damages
awarded to one class of injured plaintiffs and a savings in the systemwide costs of litigation."'1 89 The North Dakota Supreme Court
(claiming the support of Wisconsin, Kansas, and Nebraska) insisted on
a "close correspondence between statutory classification and legislative goals."' 190 The damage cap did not promote the "assurance of
availability of competent medical and hospital services at reasonable
180. Samsel v. Wheeler Transport Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541, 559-60 (Kan. 1990) (Herd, J.,
dissenting).
181. Jones 555 P.2d at 414.
182. Id. at 413; Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 293 N.W.2d 550, 564 (Iowa 1980).
183. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 166 (Ala. 1991).
184. Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 396 S.E.2d 525, 538 (Va. 1989) (Russell, J., dissenting).
185. Moore, 592 So. 2d at 168; Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717, 728 (Ohio 1986).
186. Moore, 592 So. 2d at 168; Mominee, 503 N.E.2d at 728.
187. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 689-92 (Tex. 1988).

188. Mominee, 503 N.E.2d at 728; (Brown, J., concurring); see also Morris v. Savoy, 576
N.E.2d 765, 770 n.4 (Ohio 1991).
189. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1077 (Ill. 1997).
190. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978).
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cost... "191 The Alabama Supreme Court asked "whether the benefit
sought to be bestowed upon society outweighs the detriment to private rights occasioned by the statute."'192 "It clearly appears that [the
Alabama Medical Liability Act], by balancing the direct and palpable
burden placed upon catastrophically injured victims of medical malpractice against the indirect and speculative benefit that may be conferred on society, represents an unreasonable exercise of the police
power."'1 93 Because the trial court was entitled to find there was no
"availability or cost crisis" in North Dakota, the "drastic limitation on
recovery ... is a violation of the Equal Protection provision .... ,,194
The damage cap "lacks any 'reasonable and substantial relation' to the
legislative objective."'

95

"We are unable to find ...

any evidence to

buttress the proposition that there is a rational connection between
awards over $200,000 and malpractice insurance rates. There is evidence of the converse, however."'1 96
Judges questioned each empirical claim by the legislature. Both
premiums and medical costs continued to rise rapidly despite these
laws. 197 "[E]xperience since 1975 has demonstrated the fallacy of the
Legislature's assumption that the reduction of malpractice premiums
paid by hospitals would result in a meaningful containment of hospital
costs."' 98 Indeed, the legislation might have the perverse effect of
raising premiums. 199 These laws reduced compensation but failed to
discourage unmeritorious cases, encourage meritorious ones, or facilitate settlement. 200 There was no evidence that refusing to toll the statute of limitations for minors or incompetents lowered insurance
premiums, especially since the insurance industry's own data showed
that such claims were very rare; the Superintendent of Insurance was
not even required to determine the statute's effect. 20 ' Because of the
infrequency of large awards, damage caps would not significantly
lower premiums. Instead, these laws might perversely reduce the
191. Id. at 135.
192. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 166 (Ala. 1991).

193. Id.
194. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d at 136.
195. Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 538 (Va. 1988).
196. Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 770 (Ohio 1991).
197. See Moore, 592 So. 2d at 165-71; Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 961-79 (Ariz. 1984);
Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 293 N.W. 2d 550, 561-68 (Iowa 1980) (Reynoldson, C.J.,
dissenting); Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717, 736-40 (Ohio 1986) (Wright, J., dissenting).
198. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 683 P.2d
670, 686 (Cal. 1984) (Mosk, Associate J., dissenting).
199. Roa v. Lodi Med. Group, Inc., 695 P.2d 164, 181-83 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
200. Kenyon, 688 P.2d at 976-79; Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D. 1978).
201. Kenyon, 688 P.2d at 976-79; Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 135-36; Mominee, 503 N.E.2d at 274-
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quality of medical care by lowering the liability incentive.202 It was
bad policy to burden workers compensation insurers rather than medical malpractice insurers. "[T]o shift the burden of those rising [medical malpractice] costs to employers ...

is not a rational approach to

achieve the purported goal of better health care for the residents of
California. Indeed,20 3 from a public policy perspective, it is
counterproductive.
These judges saw themselves championing weak, powerless, individual victims against organized wealthy defendants' lobbies. Where deferential judges allowed legislatures to act "at whim," these judges
refused to subordinate the "constitutional right of access to the courts
for redress of injuries" to "majoritarian whim. '204 They felt an "obligation ... to protect the Kansas Constitution from encroachment by

legislative action. ' 20 5 During the preceding bicentennial year "our
people have learned the importance of protecting the individual from
encroachment by the majority of those in positions of power, no matter how well-meaning. Without the concept of equal justice for all,
our basic liberties would have disappeared from the scene years
ago."' 20 6 The state and federal bills of rights "are there to protect
every citizen, including a person who has no clout, and the little guy
on the block. They are there to protect the rights of a brain-damaged
baby, a quadriplegic farmer or business executive, and a horribly disfigured housewife who is a victim of medical malpractice. ' 20 7 A limit
on plaintiffs' lawyers' contingency fees without a comparable limit on
the fees of defense lawyers "implicates the fairness of the judicial process itself. '20 8 The power to cap (damages) was the power to destroy
(causes of action). "[I]f the legislature may constitutionally cap recovery at $450,000, there is no discernible reason why it could not cap the
recovery at some other figure, perhaps $50,000, or $1,000, or even
$1."209 Far from deliberating, legislatures rushed through unamended
long, complicated bills drafted by industry representatives. 210 Judges
claimed, paradoxically, that it was more "respectful" to invalidate an
202. Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 293 N.W.2d 550, 561-68 (Iowa 1980) (Reynoldson,
C.J., dissenting).
203. Barme v. Wood, 689 P.2d 446, 452 (Cal. 1984) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
204. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1089 (Fla. 1987).
205. Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 256 (Kan. 1988).
206. Id. at 257.
207. Id. at 258.
208. Roa v. Lodi Med. Ctr. Group, Inc., 695 P.2d 164, 186 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
209. Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1089.
210. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1067-69 (IUI.1997).
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entire statute and let the legislature rewrite it than to engage in "ad
1
hoc adjustments."'21
IV. How

SHOULD COURTS DEAL WITH TORT LEGISLATION?

The assertion that courts should defer to legislatures in making tort
law is fatally flawed. True, judges are less responsive to the electorate
than legislators. In practice, however, the need to raise money for reelection drives legislators into the pockets of special interests. Judges,
by contrast, often come to conceive of themselves as guardians of a
general interest.21 2 Their relative electoral irresponsibility, paradoxically, protects them from capture by special interests. 213 (Recognizing
this, organizations of tortfeasors and insurers are planning to use their
considerable muscle to influence the election of state supreme court
justices). 214 Statutes are rarely accompanied by a persuasive, even a
good-faith, attempt to demonstrate their contribution to the general
good. Judicial decisions, by contrast, always try to do so, however imperfectly they may succeed.21 5 Legislatures sometimes deliberate,
commissioning research to identify problems and alternative solutions, holding hearings to encourage public input, amending bills to
recognize divergent interests and views, and producing comprehensive
responses to social problems. More often, however, they do nothing
of the sort. The numerous state statutes limiting medical malpractice
liability in the 1970s were rushed through with little discussion and a
great deal of mindless and inappropriate imitation. Special interests
conduct much of what passes for "research" and perform much of the
legislative drafting. Many legislators know little about the bills on
which they are voting. The process is often invisible. By contrast, major law reform cases often attract considerable publicity. A wide
range of amicus briefs allows many viewpoints to be expressed. 21 6
Majority opinions, concurrences, and dissents present thorough analy211. Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 695 P.2d 665, 668 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
212. For examples of this in the unlikely setting of South Africa, see RICHARD L. ABEL, POLITics By OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST APARTHEID, 1980-1994 (1995).
213. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 501-02, & n.1 (3d ed. 1986).
214. Illinois Tort "Reform" Controversy IllustratesPartisanMovement to Restrict Court'sJurisdiction, CIVIL JUSTICE DIGEST, Winter 1998, at 1.
215. For 30 years I have vigorously criticized tort law, both in the classroom and in writing.
See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, chap. 20
(D. Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
216. But the very characteristics that advantage groups in the legislative process may also
advantage them in litigation. Stephen M. Bundy & Einer R. Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the
Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REv.
313 (1991); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1975).
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ses of the issues. The numerous decisions critically scrutinizing legislation limiting tort liability represent an approach to judicial review of
state constitutionality embraced by a large number of diverse,
217
respected jurisdictions.
How, then, should courts make tort law? 218 A strong critique of the

CMT would invert it, declaring that courts always favor unorganized
interests and legislatures the organized. This is neither true 219 nor
necessary to my argument. I think it incontrovertible, however, that
in confrontations between organized and unorganized interests, legislatures sometimes favor the former and courts the latter. Several propositions follow from this, in order of increasing controversy (and
correlative tentativeness).
1. Judges must continue to refine the common law of torts.
a. The age of the rule being modified is irrelevant.
b. Legislative silence signifies nothing about legislative intent.
c. Legislative modification signifies no legislative intent about
common law rules not modified.
2. Judges may narrowly construe legislation whose wisdom they question, since the legislature can always correct an interpretation with
which it disagrees.
217. See supra Part III.B and accompanying text.
218. A number of scholars have advanced arguments for more stringent judicial review. See,
e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985); MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE
SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 14-17 (1966); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 318-26 (1980); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, The 1988
Term Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 85-86 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, The 1983 Term Foreward: The Court and the Economic System, 98
HARV. L. REV. 4, 42-45 (1984); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHL-KENT L. REV. 123, 153-56 (1989). See also Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REv 703, 748-50 (1984); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 303-05 (1988); Macey, supra note 22; Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation:Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REv. 849, 867-72 (1980);
Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U.
CHI. L. REv. 263, 290-91(1982); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REv. 29, 65 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1729-30 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 475-76 (1989). For an argument that interest-group and public
choice theories, even if empirically verified, offer no support for revising standards of judicial
review, see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive JudicialReview?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 105-09 (1991).
219. With Sacramento controlled by Democrats for the first time in decades, trial lawyers
hope to raise the damage caps on medical malpractice awards established in 1975. Dan Morain,
Bills Would Lift Some Caps on MalpracticeAwards, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1999, at A3. They also
hope to impose liability on HMO's for denial of care. Carl Ingram, Senate Panel OKs Bill on
HMO Liability, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1999, at A3, available in 1999 WL 2146767.
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3. In reviewing the constitutionality of legislation modiflying the common law of torts:
a. Judges may expect the legislature to declare its purpose explicitly and may weigh the legislation in terms of its contribution to
that purpose.
b. If the legislation rests on factual propositions, judges may evaluate the evidence supporting them (perhaps with a strong presumption of validity).
c. If the legislation facially discriminates against unorganized interests, even though they are diffuse dispersed majorities, 220 and
in favor of organized ones, scrutiny should be more critical.
If courts cease to hide behind legal process shibboleths based on
insupportable normative positions and unsubstantiated empirical assumptions, perhaps they will devote more energy to devising and testing substantive justifications for the rules they create and apply.

220. Contrast the solicitude extended to "discrete insular minorities" in United States v.
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); cf. Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products,
98 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1985).

